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For the greater part of last century, health care was run and financed by a systen1 
known as the fee-for-service system. Just as the name implies, physicians would perform 
a service, then charge the patient a pa11icular fee. The patient would then pay for the 
service out-of-pocket, or if the patient had health insurance, he or she would send the bill 
to their insurer for reimbursement. Physicians and patients were both very pleased with 
the way this system was run. Doctors had a great deal of earning power and professional 
autonomy, while patients were free to choose any doctor they wished while requesting 
any and all tests and procedures. However, the fee-for-service system's general disregard 
of cost-efficiency ultimately led to its demise. 
The system of health care that replaced the fee-for-service system was known as 
managed care. Managed care differed from fee-for-service medicine in that managed 
care was pre-paid, more coordinated, and paid much more attention to the economics of 
medicine. Managed care can be traced back as early as the beginning of the 20th century, 
but it really first made an impact on health care with the HMO Act of 1973. Managed 
care organizations attempted to be very cost -efficient and coordinated using a variety of 
techniques. Among these tools was the establishment of provider networks, as well as 
the use of utilization reviews, gatekeepers, and preventative medicine. 
Managed care was able to cut health care costs, but this came at the price of 
reduced choice for patients. As a result of consumer demands, many managed care 
organization began to offer different managed care plans. These options, such as PPO 
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and POS plans, offered patients more choice of provider but generally came at a slightly 
higher price. However, many patients seemed willing to pay this as PPOs passed the 
more restrictive HMOs in number of enrollees. 
Not only are there many different types of managed care organizations, but 
managed care exists in many different "stages" across the nation. In other words, 
managed care has had a much greater effect on health care in some regions of the country 
than in others. Regardless of how great the impact is, managed care has drastically 
changed how health care affects physicians, patients, and even the Medicare population. 
Physicians generally have a negative view of managed care. Whereas they once 
had one of the most financially lucrative and most autonomous professions around, 
managed care both reduced doctors' average salary and second-guessed many of their 
decisions. Many physicians believe this hurt the quality of care that patients received. 
Moreover, managed care completely altered the practices of both generalist and specialist 
physicians. Generalists were no longer finding themselves practicing family medicine, 
but were playing the role of gatekeeper for managed care organizations. Although their 
role has not changed as much, specialists have seen major decreases in their earnings 
because managed care has put the squeeze on many of their procedures. Both types of 
physicians are now leaving their solo practices in order to join group practices, which 
help physicians reduce overhead by sharing resources. 
The practice of capitation perhaps had more impact on physicians than any other 
aspect of managed care. Capitation is the process by which doctors receive a flat fee 
each month for each of the HMO's enrollees that they provide care for. The doctors 
receive this fee whether or not the patient is treated. The idea behind capitation is that 
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doctors will stop over-utilizing care if their personal income is at stake. However, critics 
of capitation claim that many doctors withhold care in order to maintain their personal 
earnings. This is just one of several ways that managed care has put a strain on the 
doctor-patient relationship. 
Just like physicians, many patients also did not respond well to the rise of managed 
care. They viewed provider networks as unnecessary restrictions, and were often 
frustrated by denials of their proposed treatments. In fact, there was such a consumer 
backlash against managed care that many state and federal legislatures made patients' 
rights a top priority. Many states passed laws banning HMO practices that potentially 
harmed the quality of care for patients. Moreover, many laws were also passed to make 
managed care more physician-friendly. 
In addition to patients' rights, there are many other ethical issues that have arisen 
because of managed care. The practice of for-profit medicine is a very hot topic, as many 
believe that this damages the quality of health care. Also very controversial is the 
practice of selective marketing, where managed care organizations seek to recruit 
healthy, and thus less costly, patients. 
Managed care also had a large impact on the Medicare and Medicaid population. 
Medicare, a government program designed to provide health care to the elderly, seemed 
to be the new "promised land" for many HMOs in the mid-1990s, as there were many 
inefficiencies to be worked out of the system. However, the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997 slashed Medicare reimbursements, and put higher standards on HMOs who wished 
to remain in the Medicare market. However, Medicaid, a government program that 
provides health care for the impoverished and permanently disabled, continues to enroll 
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its patients in managed care. Medicaid is different from Medicare in that each state 
decides how to administer their Medicaid program. In 1994, Tennessee decided to enroll 
all of its Medicaid-eligible population in managed care, a program known as TennCare. 
TennCare provides a useful case study on the pros and cons of both managed Medicaid 
and attempts at universal health care coverage. 
Where managed care is headed in the future is a subject of much debate. Some 
experts believe that the HMO industry is showing many signs of a dying industry. If 
managed care fails, then a government-run health care system is a distinct possibility. 
Although some people support the idea of a government system, many oppose it. They 
believe that a government-run health care system would be too bureaucratic, and that the 
quality of care would be reduced. In order for managed care to become the nation's 
permanent health care system, the industry must now shift its focus from cost control to 
quality control. 
I propose six strategies for the managed care industry to improve the quality of 
health care without sacrificing its cost-efficiency. The six strategies are: 1) the shift 
from for-profit to non-profit care, 2) preventative medicine, 3) consumers choosing 
health plans rather than employers, 4) long-term contract agreements between plans and 
purchasers, 5) a more cooperative relationship between providers and plans, and 6) the 
attainment of universal health care coverage. The funding for universal coverage could 
come from a variety of sources, such as the government or even employers. There is 
much debate about what would be the best way to finance universal health care coverage. 
Although there may not be any obvious short-term incentives for some of these 
strategies, providers, plans, and purchasers need to realize that these strategies are 
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focused on the long-term success of managed care. If every party involved in health care 
could focus on these tactics, managed care would be solidified as the health care system 
of the future, while making everyone almost completely forget about how medicine was 
run before the rise of managed care. 
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Health care is the largest industry in the United States, consuming every i h dollar 
of the gross domestic product (Bennahum 1999). In 1996 alone, the nation spent over 
one trillion dollars on health care expenditures (Baldor 1998). The United States' health 
care industry has gone through more changes in the past ten years than perhaps any other 
business in modem times. First of all, health care spending has grown exponentially over 
the past half-century. Per capita health care spending stood at $141 in 1960, but by 1997 
this figure had risen to $3,925. Furthermore, per capita medical expenditures are 
expected to rise to over $7,000 by 2008 (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). Several 
factors contributed to this incredible growth. The population in the United States in 
increasingly getting older, and it is the elderly that require the most medical care. Also, 
medical technology has made tremendous strides during this time, and with increased 
technology comes an increased price tag. These rising medical costs first became an 
issue during the Nixon administration, and eventually reached a boiling point in the late 
1980s. By this time, health insurance premiums were increasing 15 to 20% per year 
(Berenson and Zelman 1998, Brink and Shute 1997, and others). 
Up until this point, health insurance and physician reimbursement were set up on a 
"fee-for-service" basis. Although many doctors and patients tell stories about how 
wonderful this "old system" was, it will be shown that in fact this system had many 
flaws. The method of health care financing that replaced the fee-for-service system was 
known as managed care. Among the many differences between the two systems, one of 
the most important differences between managed care and fee-for-service was the fact 
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that managed care was on a prepaid basis, whereas fee-for-service was not. Using stricter 
controls and guidelines, as well as other cost-control methods that will be discussed later, 
managed care was able to bring spiraling insurance premium costs under control. By 
1996, health care premiums were only rising about 3% per year (Brink and Shute 1997). 
Managed care was also able to become the dominant form of health care financing in the 
nation. Americans enrolled in managed care organizations rose from 33 million in 1988, 
to 56 n1illion in 1995, to over 80 million by 1998 (Berenson and Zelman 1998). 
However, managed care suffered a major backlash at the hands of doctors and 
patients. Doctors were displeased with their professional autonomy being reduced, and 
patients did not like that they had fewer choices of doctors and hospitals. At present, 
managed care organizations are trying to gear their products to be more consumer-
friendly. However, this comes at an extra price. 
There are still many things wrong with the way health care is financed today. 
Almost all sources indicate that the number of Americans without health insurance is 
somewhere around 40 million people, or roughly 15% of the population (Baldor 1998, 
Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000, and others). There are still many inconsistencies in 
the standards and guidelines of quality medical care. Perhaps worst of all, managed care 
sometimes can lead to denial of care that turns out to be necessary for the patient's 
survival. Although these cases are the exception to the rule, they have a profound impact 
on the industry because of the extensive media coverage they receive, coverage that 
usually attacks the managed care organization. 
In the following pages, both the breakdown of the fee-for-service system and the 
rise of managed care will be discussed. This study will also look at how managed care 
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has affected doctors, patients, Medicare recipients, and Medicaid recipients. Finally, data 
will be examined to try and determine where managed care is headed in the future, and 
what strategies need to be undertaken to make sure this system works. The most 
important strategy managed care organizations can focus on right now is quality control. 
Managed care may have made a mistake by trying to cut health care costs without first 
trying to improve the quality of care. I recommend six strategies that would allow the 
managed care industry to improve the quality of care while still being cost-efficient. 
These six strategies are: 1) the shift from for-profit to non-profit care, 2) preventative 
medicine, 3) consumers choosing health plans rather than employers, 4) long-term 
contract agreements between plans and purchasers, 5) a more cooperative relationship 
between providers and plans, and 6) the attainment of universal health care coverage. By 
paying attention to these strategies, the managed care industry should solidify its position 
as America's health care system for the 21 st century and beyond. 
... 
Chapter 1 
The Rise of Managed Care 
Page 11 
The Breakdown of the Old Health Insurance System 
For the greater part of the past century, medical services were paid for on what was 
known as a fee-for-service basis. Just as the name implies, doctors would perform a test 
or procedure, the patient would be charged a "customary" fee, and either the patient or 
the patient's insurance company would float the bill. This system seemed all too simple: 
doctors performed whatever tests they could in order to diagnose a patient's symptoms, 
and the patient would pay a co-payment, usually around 200/0. The doctor was in a true 
sense the patient's advocate, he could do everything in his power to try and remedy the 
patient's ills without having to worry too much about controlling costs. 
However, the fee-for-service system, sometimes referred to as indemnity coverage, 
was not without its share of problems. For one thing, there were no universal guidelines 
to medical care. This led to much regional variation in both medical practice and health 
care spending. For example, one study showed that in one Maine county 70% of women 
over the age of 70 were given hysterectomies, while in another Maine county less than an 
hour away this number was only around 20%. In a similar study, 8% of children in one 
Vermont county were given tonsillectomies, while in a neighboring county a whopping 
70% of children underwent this procedure (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Even in the 
early 1980s when Medicare introduced diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) as a set of 
standards for its reimbursements, universal guidelines still had very little impact on 
medicine as a whole. 
The Rise of Managed Care 
Page 12 
Yet another mistake the fee-for-service system made was not utilizing preventative 
care. The general attitude in the old system was to attack and try to cure a patient's 
symptoms, rather than trying to prevent these symptoms from ever occurring. This not 
only led to higher costs, since breast cancer surgery is much more expensive than a 
mammogram, but it generally led to more patients getting serious diseases. 
Perhaps the biggest problem with the fee-for-service method of health care 
financing, and the one that ultimately led to its demise, was its failure to control costs. 
From 1965 to 1983, health care inflation averaged 12.5% a year, an average of 5% above 
the overall inflation rate (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Between 1980 and 1990 health 
care spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 8.9 to 12.2% 
(Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). Clearly, the fee-for-service system was responsible 
for these spiraling expenses. The primary reason for this was that under this system, 
physicians were rewarded for doing more. The more tests and procedures they 
performed, the more fees they could charge, and the greater their income was. The result 
was that a great deal of procedures being performed by physicians were probably 
completely unnecessary. Even as far back as the 1970s, studies were indicating that up to 
25% of invasive procedures were inappropriate or not required (Berenson and Zelman 
1998). In essence, insurance companies were handing a blank check to physicians, and 
reimbursing them for whatever they charged without ever asking any questions. 
Moreover, the insurance companies didn't have much incentive to control costs. They 
could pass on most cost increases in the form of higher premiums. 
Yet another factor that contributed to these spiraling health care costs was the lack 
of competition in the health care market. Most health plans offered similar benefits, paid 
... 
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roughly 80% of medical bills, and allowed patients to visit any health care provider they 
wished (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Since there was really no product differentiation 
among health insurers, there was not much competition. And without major competition, 
insurance companies had even less incentive to control costs. 
Despite the high costs, consumers were in love with the fee-for-service system. 
Since patients' out-of-pocket expenses were usually in the form of deductibles or 
reasonable co-payments, patients could demand every procedure in the world with little 
or no apparent additional cost to their personal finances. Even more important, patients 
were free to choose any doctor that they liked. If they weren't satisfied with a doctor's 
performance, they could simply leave his practice and join another one, and the insurance 
companies would pay the bill just the same. This form of quality control was one of the 
fee-for-service system's strong points. Any physician with a poor performance would 
simply lose patients because of it. 
It seems that almost everyone was in love with the fee-for-service system. Patients 
enjoyed the choices, and doctors had one of the most well respected and financially 
lucrative professions in the nation. Even insurance companies were not too worried 
about the rising medical costs. Then who was it that finally decided that the fee-for-
service system's cost unconsciousness was unacceptable? 
The people who finally decided fee- for-service was not worth the price were 
employers. The majority of people who have health insurance get it as a benefit from 
their employer. By the late 1980s, the relationship between stagnant wages and rising 
premiums grew more serious, and employers began to become concerned with health 
care costs. In fact, by 1988 General Motors found that it was spending twice as much on 
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health benefits as it was on steel (Brink and Shute 1997). Not only were these high 
health care costs jeopardizing some companies' profitability, but they were affecting 
employer-employee relations. By trying to pass on some of the higher costs to their 
employees, employers were damaging their employees' morale. It was at this point that 
many employers began to decide that HMOs would be a good cost-cutting alternative for 
their health benefits. HMOs, or health maintenance organizations, were not very 
prominent in American health care at the time, but would soon introduce the nation to the 
cost-savings resulting from managed care. 
- Chapter 2 
The Rise of Managed Care 
The Rise of Managed Care 
Page 15 
Before going any further, it would be helpful to discuss exactly what the term 
"managed care" means. One generally accepted definition is that managed care is any 
prepaid health care service within a network or group of certain providers (Baldor 1998). 
Although many people think that managed care is a relatively new phenomenon, its roots 
actually date back almost a hundred years. 
The earliest known form of managed care is found in Tacoma, Washington in the 
year 1910. In this small industrial town, two doctors contracted with a lumber company 
to provide medical care for their employees (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). The 
arrangement that was made required the lumber company to pay the doctors $50 per 
employee, per month of coverage. In exchange, the doctors provided any and all medical 
services to the employees, regardless of the cost (Bennahum 1999). It was not until the 
1940s, however, that the predecessor to many of today' s managed care organizations, the 
Kaiser health plan, carne into existence. 
Henry J. Kaiser was a very successful businessman in California in the 1930s and 
40s. He owned businesses of all types, and had over 100,000 employees (Bennahum 
1999). In the late 1930s, Henry Kaiser became aware of a physician by the name of Dr. 
Sidney Garfield that was supplying on-the-job, prepaid medical care for a large 
manufacturing company in Southern California. Mr. Kaiser then made an arrangement 
with Dr. Garfield where he paid the doctor in advance for all on-the-job medical care. In 
an even more innovative move, Mr. Kaiser allowed employees to deduct a certain portion 
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of their wages in exchange for off-the-job care for the employee's family. By 1942, 
Henry Kaiser had over 90,000 of his employees covered under this arrangement 
(Bennahum 1999). In 1945, Mr. Kaiser opened this system to public enrollment, and it 
became known as the Kaiser Permanente Health Plan (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 
2000). It was this health plan that managed care organizations would try to emulate 
during the early stages of the managed care movement. 
Gradually, a few more managed care organizations began to pop up. By the 1950s 
and 60s, at least most people were familiar with nlanaged care and what it was about. 
However, it was not until during the Nixon administration that managed care took center 
stage in the health care financing scene. Nixon's administration decided that health care 
costs were on the verge of getting out of hand. A physician named Dr. Paul Ellwood 
approached the administration with an idea for health care financing reform. Dr. Ellwood 
believed that the fee-for-service system of medicine created what he called "perverse 
incentives" for physicians: rewarding providers for treating illness, and withdrawing 
those rewards when a patient's health was restored (Bennahum 1999). Dr. Ellwood 
proposed that health care organizations should focus on prevention, and that this would 
avoid a great deal of high-tech, and high-cost, medical care. He referred to these 
organizations as HMOs, or health maintenance organizations. Dr. Ellwood pointed to the 
Kaiser Permanente Health Plan as a model for HMOs. Dr. Ellwood's proposal really 
appealed to President Nixon. This was because it did not call for a great deal of 
government intervention, nor did it call for large sums of taxpayers' dollars. Moreover, it 
involved initiative in the private sector. Dr. Ellwood's idea of the HMO, which was later 
carried on by his son Paul, led Richard Nixon to pass the HMO Act of 1973. 
,., 
.. 
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The HMO Act was passed with the intent to make managed care a more 
mainstream part of American health care financing. It had two main provisions. First, it 
provided start-up grants and loans to HMOs. Secondly, it required large employers 
(more than 25 employees) to offer their employees at least one HMO option in their 
health care benefits, as long as there was an HMO in their vicinity (Berenson and Zelman 
1998). The legislation had profound effects in helping establish new HMOs. In 1970, 
before the legislation passed, there were only 33 HMOs in the United States. By 1975, 
only two years after the HMO Act went into effect, the number of HMOs nationwide had 
exploded to 166 (Bennahum 1999). 
As stated earlier, when health care premiums began spiraling out of control in the 
late 1980s, employers decided to turn to HMOs for a cost-cutting solution to medical 
benefits. This trend progressed so rapidly among employers during the early 1990s that 
managed care became the dominant form of health care financing in the nation. By 1993, 
managed care enrollment exceeded 50% of those with job-based coverage (Deloitte & 
Touche and VHA 2000). By 1997,80% of Americans insured through their employer 
were enrolled in managed care organizations (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Today, 
managed care has become the dominant form of health care financing in the nation. By 
1999, 78.8 million Americans were enrolled in an HMO, with millions more enrolled in 
other types of managed care organizations (Coile 2000). 
What were the goals of managed care organizations that made them so appealing to 
employers? The model of the ideal managed care organization was actually quite clear-
cut, simple, and practical. Managed care sought to critically evaluate patient care for cost 
and efficiency, so that no one would receive excessive or unnecessary care. Physicians 
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and hospitals would be encouraged to be as efficient as possible with their time and 
resources. These factors would lead to lower insurance costs, and the savings could even 
be used to help finance care for the uninsured (Bennahum 1999). 
Managed care organizations use many different tools and techniques to help "trim 
the fat" off of health care costs. Among these tools are the practice of selective 
contracting and the establishment of provider networks, utilization reviews and pre-
authorizations, the use of primary care physicians as health care "gatekeepers," and 
preventative medicine. Each of these practices has had a unique impact on the practice of 
medicine; while some have improved both cost and quality, others have had a more 
negati ve overall effect. 
Selection of and subsequent use of a network of physicians is the feature that 
probably most distinguishes managed care from the fee-for-service system. In the old 
system, a patient could go see any physician that he or she pleased, without having to 
worry about whether or not their insurance company would reimburse the visit. 
However, managed care organizations enter into contracts with individual doctors, and 
sometimes groups of doctors, to establish a "network" of doctors that their patients are 
allowed to see. HMOs usually do not reimburse any visit to a physician outside the 
network unless it has been previously approved by the health plan. 
Establishing networks has allowed managed care organizations to reduce costs. 
When setting up contracts with doctors, many HMOs simply contracted with physicians 
from whom they could obtain the deepest discounts. Although this may not have led to 
the highest possible quality of care, it quickly helped reduce the health care premiums 
that were rising out of control. As managed care became more prevalent, more doctors 
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became willing to accept discounted contracts from HMOs, simply because more and 
more patients were enrolled in HMOs. HMOs could then use the threat of not contracting 
with a physician to obtain a discount from him. 
Selective contracting can have its advantages. One major benefit would be that it 
could increase communication among physicians in the network, leading to fewer errors 
in patient care. Yet another plus would be that many of the more successful HMOs could 
use selective contracting as an instrument to build a top-notch panel of physicians. On 
the contrary, this has rarely happened. Most HMOs have been more likely to use 
selective contracting as a weapon for getting concessions from financially insecure 
doctors. Establishing a network of doctors whose only common ground is willingness to 
accept deep discounts could lead to less coordination than in the old system (Berenson 
and Zelman 1998). 
Another technique used by managed care organizations that has garnered more 
criticism than praise is the use of utilization reviews. A utilization review is an analysis 
by an outside committee, usually employed by the managed care organization, to make 
sure that the medical care a patient is receiving is "medically necessary." Generally, 
there are three types of utilization reviews: prospective, concurrent, and retrospective 
(Baldor 1998). Prospective reviews, also referred to as pre-authorizations, are the most 
common. In a prospective review, the HMO's committee reviews a proposed treatment, 
and then decides not only if the treatment is warranted, but also whether or not the patient 
could get equal benefit from a less costly treatment or procedure. In a concurrent review, 
a physician may receive memos or phone calls asking if a patient is ready to go home 
from the hospital yet. In a retrospective review, usually the most frustrating type of 
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utilization review for a physician, the HMO's committee does a random audit of care 
after a treatment, and then decides whether or not the treatment was required and if they 
will reimburse the physician for it. 
There are a couple of major problems with utilization reviews. First of all, there is 
a possibility that an HMO will deny a treatment that is necessary, perhaps because they 
are not aware of a patient's special circumstances. Even though this does not happen as 
often as many people believe, when it does happen it can lead to court battles between the 
HMO and the patient, and to noisy front-page stories in local papers. Moreover, too 
much pre-authorization can lead to a nightmare in administrative costs. This is leading 
some health plans to drop the practice of utilization reviews altogether. Aetna, the 
nation's largest insurer, said that it would no longer require pre-approvals for many 
surgical procedures and certain hospital stays. Aetna's motivation is to eliminate some of 
the ill will between the health plan and both doctors and patients (Bernstein 2000). 
Another large managed care organization, United Health Group, said that they were 
getting rid of most pre-authorization procedures because studies showed that it was 
costing more to process requests than the pre-authorizations were saving (Appleby 2000). 
One tool of managed care that has received a lot of mixed reviews is the use of 
primary care physicians as health care "gatekeepers." A gatekeeper is a primary-care 
doctor that an HMO employs to coordinate a patient's care. Each patient enrolled in an 
HMO is required to choose a gatekeeper from the HMO's primary care network. This 
gatekeeper will then be responsible for overseeing all of the patient's care. These doctors 
are supposed to emphasize prevention, and make sure that patient's see specialists only 
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when absolutely necessary. In fact, most HMOs will not reimburse a patient for a visit to 
a specialist unless the patient's gatekeeper has approved it. 
Ideally, gatekeepers can improve health care quality while also reducing costs. 
Gatekeepers can increase the quality of a patient's care by avoiding inconsistencies, 
duplication of efforts, and unnecessary procedures (Bennahum 1999). At the same time, 
reducing unnecessary or marginally effective care also helps the HMO's bottom line. 
And since specialist visits come at a much higher price than do generalist visits, the 
gatekeeper also helps the HMO reduce costs by reducing visits to specialists. 
However, some physicians feel that the practice of gatekeeping is not so beneficial. 
For starters, they feel that it has led to a tremendous work overload on primary-care 
physicians, drastically reducing the amount of time the physician gets to spend with each 
patient. Furthermore, some specialists feel that primary care physicians are not 
adequately trained to play the role of gatekeeper. How physicians feel the gatekeeper 
role has affected their practices will be discussed in more detail later. 
Despite all of the mixed feelings regarding these other tools of managed care, all 
parties involved in health care delivery view preventative medicine as a beneficial 
practice. Many HMOs across the country are now offering more mammograms, 
childhood immunizations, screenings for diabetes, and other preventative tests and 
screenings. One of the major changes resulting from this type of health care is that 
hospital inpatient days have been drastically reduced. In 1983, the average number of 
hospital inpatients per day, nationwide, was somewhere around one million. By 1996, 
after the rise of managed care, this number had been reduced to 685,000 (Coile 2000). 
Managed care organizations are always trying to avoid inpatient care, because this is 
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generally the most expensive type of medicine. As for the impatient care that could not 
be avoided by preventative medicine, HMOs have tried to move as much as possible to 
an outpatient setting. For clarification, inpatient care is any care in which the patient 
stays in the hospital overnight, while in outpatient care the patient returns home during 
the same day as the procedure. Because HMOs realized that outpatient care, also 
sometimes referred to as ambulatory care, was much less expensive than inpatient care, 
by the early 1990s outpatient surgeries exceeded inpatient surgeries (Coile 2000). 
Not only does preventative medicine lead to reduced costs by decreasing hospital 
inpatient care, but this type of medicine also has a benefit for the patient. Catching 
something early, such as a cancerous breast tumor, is much less traumatic than being 
hospitalized for breast cancer. Since this method of reducing costs is also an advantage 
for patients, no one has really had any valid complaints against preventative medicine. 
All of these techniques used by managed care organizations showed evidence of 
bringing spiraling health care costs under control. Between 1995 and 1997, health 
insurance premium increases actually fell below the inflation rate for the first time in over 
20 years (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Even though all of these techniques employed by 
managed care were successful in reducing health care expenditures, many did not go over 
well with consumers. Many consumers were unhappy with the restricted choices of 
physicians and hospitals. Many patients also had complaints that denials of treatment 
were coming too often. To respond to consumer demands, managed care organization 
began to offer many other options beside the traditional HMO. These new options are an 
integral part of how managed care is shaped today. 
Chapter 3 
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The Many Forms of Today's Managed Care 
During the early stages of managed care, HMOs existed in forms that are known 
today as staff-model and group-model. In a staff-model HMO, the health plan contracts 
with individual doctors who beconle employees of the HMO. These physicians work 
exclusively with the HMO with whom they contract, and therefore are not allowed to see 
patients that are not enrolled in that particular HMO. The group-model HMO is very 
similar to the staff-model, the only difference being that the HMO contracts with an 
existing group of physicians rather than with individual ones. In these early models of 
HMOs, the health plans had clinics for their contracted doctors to practice in. However, 
the large outlay of money to build clinics forced the HMOs to hire fewer physicians than 
they would have liked. This resulted in limited choice of provider for the patient, and 
thus these two types of HMO plans are more restrictive than any other type. Because of 
their restrictive choices, enrollment in staff-model and group-model HMOs has been on 
the decline for the past several years (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). 
The next type of plan offered by HMOs was brought about by the creation of IP As, 
or independent practice associations. An IP A is a group of physicians that has been 
formed for the sole purpose of contracting with managed care organizations (Baldor 
1998). This had two major impacts on the managed care industry. First, the IP As 
allowed physicians to contract with HMOs, but still maintain their practices with patients 
outside the HMO. The advent of the IP A also allowed HMOs to greatly reduce their 
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initial cash outlay because now they did not have to build clinics; they could simply send 
their enrollees to one of the IPA physician's previously established offices. Since HMOs 
were saving a lot of money by contracting with IPAs, they were able to not only improve 
their profit margins, but also could afford to contract with even more physicians and offer 
consumers a broader choice of health care providers. 
Still, many consumers found that they were displeased with the provider networks 
that had been established by HMOs, even the ones as broad as offered by the IP A-model. 
HMOs would generally not reirrlburse a patient for a visit to a doctor outside the plan's 
network, and this made many people realize that they wanted to be able to choose their 
doctor completely on their own. Because of this, the next type of managed care plan to 
emerge was the PPO, or the preferred provider organization. PPOs were drastically 
different than any type of HMO plan that had been previously offered. A PPO is 
typically made up of a group of physicians, sometimes including hospitals, who agree to 
provide care for a set price (Coile 2000). PPOs contract with health insurance con1panies 
so that the insurer may offer the PPO's services as one of its health plan options, but 
sometimes PPOs contract directly with employers (Coile 2000). PPOs generally offer a 
broader choice of providers than HMOs, and they generally use fewer utilization reviews 
than their HMO counterparts. Also, PPOs do not require their patients to use a 
gatekeeper to coordinate care. Of course, reducing all of these restrictions on care comes 
at a price, as PPO premiums are generally higher than HMO premiums. However, the 
PPO offers consumers perhaps what they missed most from the fee-for-service system, 
the freedom (although somewhat limited) to choose whatever doctor they pleased. 
Patients of a PPO are allowed to visit physicians that are not in the PPO's network, with 
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the only requirement being a co-payment that usually runs about 20-30% (Berenson and 
Zelman 1998). 
Consumers really warmed to preferred provider organizations. Even though PPO 
plans are more expensive than HMOs, often times the difference in premiums is only 
around $10 or less per month (Coile 2000). Not surprisingly, millions of people decided 
that this extra $10 per month was well worth the freedom of provider choice. In fact, 
PPOs have now surpassed HMOs as the dominant type of managed care organizations. 
PPOs continue to grow, having now enrolled roughly 90 million people, or 34% of those 
with health insurance. Meanwhile, HMO growth has been stagnant, hovering around 80 
million enrollees, or 30% of the market, for the last couple of years (Coile 2000). 
Preferred provider organizations became so popular in the insurance market that 
many HMOs decided they needed to come up with a competitive product. As a result, 
many HMOs began to offer what they called POS, or point-of-service, health plan 
options. The POS plan, also sometimes referred to as an open-access HMO, is very 
similar to the PPO plan. Patients are allowed to visit physicians outside the network for a 
reasonable co-payment. The thing that differentiates POS plans from PPOs is the fact 
that POS plans use HMO techniques, such as gatekeepers and capitated payments 
(discussed in much greater detail later), within the network of providers (Berenson and 
Zelman 1998). The point-of-service option proved to be a profitable tool for HMOs, and 
a vast majority of HMOs scrambled to offer them. In fact, by 1997, over 75% of HMOs 
offered their customers a POS option (Berenson and Zelman 1998). 
Today's managed care environment is not only shaped by the many different types 
of plans offered, but also by the fact that managed care exists in several progressive 
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"stages" in different parts of the nation. In other words, there are some regions of the 
country in which managed care is practically the only form of health care financing 
available, and yet there are other regions where managed care has almost no impact on 
health care financing whatsoever. In his book New Century Healthcare: Strategies for 
Providers, Purchasers, and Plans, author Russell Coile divides these different levels of 
managed care penetration into what he calls the "five stages of managed care" (2000). 
In a Stage 1 market, which Coile satirically refers to as a market that "can't spell 
HMO," managed care hardly has any effect on the health care financing scene. Stage one 
markets are characterized by less than 5% of the population being enrolled in managed 
care organizations (Coile 2000). These areas usually have a thin population density, and 
have very few large employers. Stage one markets experience a great deal of physician 
resistance to HMOs, as reimbursements are still paid largely on a fee-for-service basis. 
Other than in very rural areas, it is difficult to find a stage one managed care market these 
days. Almost every metropolitan area experiences some form of managed care. 
Stage 2 markets are those that have between roughly 5 and 15% of the population 
enrolled in managed care organizations (Coile 2000). A common scenario for these 
markets is to have one main HMO that offers managed care plans to the population. 
During this stage, physicians and hospitals encounter more hassles from HMOs over 
approval of care, and thus many see their incomes start to slide. During stage two many 
physicians begin to form provider organizations so that they will have a bit more clout 
when negotiating with health plans. 
Once a region has moved into the third stage, the transition to a managed care 
marketplace is complete. Coile defines stage 3 markets as those with 15-25% of the 
The Rise of Managed Care 
Page 27 
population enrolled in managed care plans (2000). Although many of them may not like 
it, most physicians have accepted managed care by this time. There are usually two or 
three HMOs competing for enrollees, just as there are two or three main provider 
networks beginning to emerge (Coile 2000). Stage 3 markets are perhaps the most 
chaotic, because many old patterns are disappearing and networking is very active (Coile 
2000). 
Stage 4, also referred to as managed competition, refers to a market in which 
between 25 and 40% of the population is enrolled in managed care (Coile 2000). This is 
the ugliest stage of managed care, as physicians are in head-to-head competition with 
managed care organizations to see who will control the market. It is usually stage four 
markets that lead to heated disputes that can often end up on the cover of USA Today. 
HMOs have several advantages over physicians, as they have much more capital, and 
they also own the enrollees. However, physicians try to use their patients' loyalty and 
cooperation with hospitals as leverage. Neither HMOs nor physicians are really to blame 
for these types of disputes. Rather, it is the large employers who are encouraging HMO 
price competition, which leads to cuts in physician reimbursements (Coile 2000). 
Stage 5 markets, those with over 40% of the population enrolled in an HMO, are 
not very common and are mostly found on the west coast (Coile 2000). By this time, 
managed care is the rule rather than the exception. Even Medicare and Medicaid 
programs are committed to managed care strategies in a stage five market. By this point, 
physician's incomes are not quite hurting quite as much due to the fact that both doctors 
and insurers have worked to reduce some of the high administrative costs associated with 
the early stages of managed care penetration (Coile 2000). By the time a market reaches 
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stage 5, most parties involved are usually concerned with how they can make the system 
work better rather than how they can gain an advantage. 
As can be seen, managed care takes many shapes and forms all across the nation. 
Sometimes it can be quite confusing for customers to distinguish among PPO, POS, 
HMO, IP A and any other managed care abbreviations that may be thrown their way. 
Moreover, since managed care has experienced different levels of penetration in different 
regions of the country, every physician and patient has a unique experience concerning 
how managed care has affected them. 
Chapter 4 
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The Impact of Managed Care on Physicians and Their Practices 
The group of people that has been the most opposed to managed care has been 
physicians. Actually, this really should not come as much of a surprise. By the 1980s, 
being a doctor was one of the most financially lucrative prospects in the country. Since 
patients did not "shop around" based on price, doctors did not have to compete with one 
another by lowering fees. What's more, physicians had basically been trained to try 
everything that they had been trained to do, regardless of the benefit/cost ratio (Berenson 
and Zelman 1998). As medical technology became more expensive, this resulted in huge 
increases in the average physician's income. Not only did physicians make very 
comfortable livings, but they had perhaps more professional autonomy than any other 
occupation. Rarely did people question a physician's decision, creating a "doctor knows 
best" attitude among the entire population. 
For all of these reasons, doctors were very pleased with the way the fee-for-service 
system was run. When HMOs first began popping up in the 1940s and 50s, most doctors 
looked down upon this type of medicine. The American Medical Association was quite 
possibly the strongest factor in preventing any success for early managed care 
organizations, sometimes going as far as denouncing managed care as "socialism" 
(Berenson and Zelman 1998). 
Doctors successfully beat down the effort to reform health care financing for a long 
time because of their credibility as professionals, the patient's idea that their doctor 
"knew best," and also because of America's fear of government intervention (Berenson 
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and Zelman 1998). Even as managed care has come to dominate the health care market 
today, most physicians still have a negative view of its impact on medicine. 
No one should be shocked that physicians are opposed to managed care. First of 
all, the rise of managed care has decreased their incomes. Average physician income 
dropped from 1994 to 1995, marking the first drop since the inception of the American 
Medical Association (Easterbrook 1997). Physician income continued to decline, as 
between 1996 and 1997 the average physician's salary fell another 2% (Deloitte & 
Touche and VHA 2000). This income decrease particularly hit some specialists very 
hard, as reduced hospitalization due to managed care resulted in reduced revenues for the 
specialists. 
Even though there should probably not be too much concern about doctors' 
incomes suffering, another concern is that many doctors feel that managed care is hurting 
the quality of medicine that the patients receive. In one recent study, 88% of Connecticut 
doctors surveyed said that the quality of care was worse under managed care than it was 
under the fee-for-service system (Ball 2000). Specifically, the doctors said that they were 
not being able to spend enough time with their patients, and that they did not have 
enough autonomy in their medical decisions. 
Physician autonomy is obviously threatened by some managed care techniques 
such as utilization reviews. Many physicians feel that this is the most negative aspect of 
managed care. Some doctors claim that while taking histories and doing physical exams, 
they must now also think about what to include in the charts to justify their medical 
decision to insurers (Noonan 2000). The biggest problem with this situation is that the 
person or persons that are approving the doctors' decisions not only have little or no 
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medical training, but they also often have no contact with the patient. As one Chicago 
physician put it: "You can't do anything anymore without first calling an 800-number 
where someone with a high school education asks you to spell out the diagnosis" 
(Easterbrook 1997). Since insurers are sometimes n1aking medical decisions, many 
doctors have begun to wonder about the point of going through the many years of 
medical school. 
There are other managed care tools besides pre-authorizations that doctors do not 
look favorably upon. Many physicians feel that prescription formularies, which HMOs 
use to decide which drugs will be covered, are too restrictive and often do not consider 
special circun1stances. Moreover, doctors are often not pleased by HMOs setting up 
networks. Often, doctors find themselves in a group of doctors that they don't know, or 
worse, in a group of doctors that they do know as poor-quality physicians (Berenson and 
Zelman 1998). 
Doctors do have a few positive things to say about managed care. In one survey 
conducted by Kaiser, 45 % of doctors said that managed care increased the likelihood of 
preventative care. Moreover, 68 % of physicians polled said that managed care led to use 
of more practice guidelines and disease management protocols (Toner 1999). 
However, it seems that doctors feel that managed care offers more negatives than 
positives. In the same survey mentioned above that offered a few of managed care's 
advantages, 95 % of doctors said that managed care increased administrative paperwork, 
72 % said it decreased the overall quality of care that patients received, and 83 % said 
that managed care decreased the amount of time spent with patients (Toner 1999). At 
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least through the eyes of most physicians, managed care has decreased the quality of 
medical care in the United States. 
Whether or not the rise of managed care has been harmful to medicine as a whole, 
one thing that is certain is that managed care has drastically changed the practices of 
almost all physicians. Both generalists and specialists have seen incredible variations 
arise in their practices. The first phenomenon that has resulted from managed care is the 
movement of physicians away from solo practices and into group practices. This 
probably would have happened eventually without managed care, since medicine is 
becoming too technologically complex for a solo practitioner to provide high-quality care 
(Berenson and Zelman 1998). However, managed care's focus on cutting costs forced 
the move into group practices even sooner. When in a group practice, defined by the 
AMA as a practice of three or more physicians, doctors can share resources in order to 
reduce their overhead costs. They can make joint use of both expensive medical 
equipment and administrative personneL These advantages have made the solo practice a 
thing of the past, as the number of group practices nationwide nearly doubled between 
1995 and 1998, with nearly 60 % of all physicians belonging to a group practice (Deloitte 
& Touche and VHA 2000). 
In addition to increasing the nunlber of group practices, managed care has also 
completely redefined the role of the primary-care physician. Whereas most generalists in 
the past practiced as "family doctors," primary-care physicians are increasingly being 
moved out of this role into the role of HMO gatekeeper. As previously mentioned, the 
role of a gatekeeper is to coordinate a patient's care, emphasizing prevention and making 
sure that patients see specialists only when really necessary. The theory behind 
... 
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gatekeeping is sound, as the gatekeeper makes sure that relevant history or clinical 
information is not overlooked, and that costly duplications of effort are avoided 
(Berenson and Zelman 1998). 
Physicians have mixed feelings regarding how gatekeeping affects the quality of 
care. Although some primary-care physicians are discouraged by having less time to 
spend with patients, others welcome the change. Due to the widespread use of managed 
care, most hospitals are now heavily recruiting primary-care physicians. In fact, when 
asked what types of doctors they are recruiting, 76 % of hospitals mentioned primary-
care physicians, while no other specialty was even mentioned 25 % of the time (Deloitte 
& Touche and VHA 2000). Moreover, many primary-care physicians feel that specialists 
have become so technology-oriented that they forget they are caring for real people and 
not just organ systems (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Thus, some generalists believe 
gatekeeping can lead to more personal care by requiring a patient to see a primary-care 
physician. However, there are some doctors who hold the opposite view. Many doctors, 
especially specialists, feel that primary-care doctors cannot possibly stay current enough 
with all of today' s technology to make an accurate judgement on whether or not a patient 
should see a specialist (Berenson and Zelman 1998). 
Whereas there are different opinions on the effect of managed care on primary-care 
physicians, no one disagrees about how hard specialists have been hit. One of managed 
care's cost-cutting techniques is to reduce hospitalization rates. Since most specialists 
work out of hospitals, fewer patient admissions and shorter lengths of stay have led to 
decreased business for the specialists. Furthermore, the onset of managed care found that 
many procedures performed by specialists were unnecessary. Some of the fields that 
-
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were hit especially hard were radiology, plastic surgery, psychiatry, and anesthesiology 
(Anders 1995). Anesthesiology provides a useful case study of how specialists' practices 
have changed due to managed care. 
Throughout the 1980s and even into the early 1990s, during the times of rising 
health insurance premiums, anesthesiology flourished. The average salary jumped from 
$131,900 in 1982 to $228,500 in 1992 (Anders 1995). However, managed care put a 
squeeze on anesthesiology. Many of the procedures that required it were found to be 
unnecessary or inappropriate. Lower surgery volumes thus meant less business for 
anesthesiologists. Moreover, HMOs began to ask for large discounts from 
anesthesiologists, sometimes as high as 30 % (Anders 1995). Also, many hospitals began 
making use of nurse anesthetists, who typically earn less than half as much as their 
physician counterparts. 
However, if it were not for the oversupply of specialist physicians, these factors 
would not have had as much impact. The number of doctors per thousand people has 
more than doubled over the past thirty years (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). 
Moreover, by 1995, 70 % of doctors were specialists, while only 30 % were generalists 
(Baldor 1998). Since specialists were in such gross oversupply, they almost had to accept 
the discounted payments from HMOs, because if they did not certainly someone else in 
their field would. This happened to anesthesiology, where technology and high earning 
power made it an attractive specialty. Soon the job market became saturated, and in 
some large cities there were few if any anesthesiology positions available (Anders 1995). 
Thus, many specialists have seen their earning power deteriorate significantly. In some 
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specialists has led to the emergence of primary-care retraining programs. Even with all 
of the changes in physicians' practices mentioned thus far, no single aspect of managed 
care has affected the practices of all physicians as much as capitation. Capitation is the 
process employed by managed care organizations by which doctors get a flat fee each 
month for each of the HMO's enrollees that they provide care for. The doctors receive 
the "per member/per month" fee, usually adjusted for the patient's age and gender, 
regardless of whether or not the patient receives any treatment. If a referral or lab work is 
ordered, the cost is deducted from the doctor's fee. The main objective of the capitation 
system is to provide doctors with even more incentive to be cost-efficient. 
It is obvious that capitation causes doctors to be more cost -efficient, for the 
arrangement places the physician's personal income at stake. This process can be 
beneficial, as it can reduce unnecessary procedures and encourage doctors to practice 
preventative medicine. Capitation also reduces the need to review overutilization 
However, there are a couple of major problems that have arisen due to capitated 
arrangements. 
In essence, capitation shifts risk from the insurance company to the physician. 
Because of this, a physician needs a reasonable capitated patient base, usually at least 300 
patients, to safely handle this type of risk (Baldor 1998). Similarly, some doctors may 
accept capitation payments that are simply too low to cover all of the patient's needs. 
Critics of capitation say that both of these situations usually result in the physician 
skimping on care in order to avoid sacrificing his or her income. Doctors placed under 
too much risk may not order necessary tests or referrals. As one doctor put it, 
"physicians under capitation are forced to choose between their children's college fund 
-
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and their patient's well-being, with the HMO being the only sure winner" (Bennahum 
1999). Moreover, some studies suggest that doctors spend less time with capitated 
patients than with patients not under capitation (Bennahum 1999). And even though 
managed care organizations do not need to be concerned about reviews of overutilization, 
there may be a need to review whether or not doctors are underutilizing care. 
Another problem with capitated payments is that they are usually the same whether 
the patient is sick or healthy. This may cause some physicians to be particularly 
vulnerable to inadequate payments, especially those in geriatrics or underserved areas. 
Capitation is not the only form of financial incentives physicians are faced with to 
be cost-efficient. Many managed care organizations offer physicians bonuses for 
obtaining a certain hospitalization rate or other cost-cutting objective. Some plans offer 
profit -sharing options to physicians. Still others use a technique known as withholding. 
Under this arrangement, a percentage of the physician's payment is withheld until certain 
financial goals are met (Bennahum 1999). No matter what type of financial incentive is 
offered to physicians, there is still the issue of whether or not these incentives cause 
physicians to withhold necessary care. 
Despite all of these problems with capitation, it continued to increase as a tool used 
by managed care organizations throughout the 1990s. By 1998, 37.5 million HMO 
members obtained primary care under capitation arrangements (Coile 2000). Some 
specialists, especially in California where HMO penetration is very high, even began 
accepting capitated payments. The reason that doctors had to accept these undesirable 
arrangements was because, as previously mentioned, there was and still is a large 
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oversupply of physicians in the United States. If a physician refused a capitated contract, 
there was a good possibility that a nearby physician would accept it. 
How can doctors accept capitation without sacrificing their incomes? Some 
insurance companies offer doctors the option of stop-loss insurance, also known as re-
insurance. This type of insurance gives doctors coverage against the possibility of 
providing care that will exceed their capitated payment (Bennahum 1999). However, not 
very many doctors have made use of this opportunity. One thing that has happened is 
that there have been several federal and state regulations placed on the financial 
incentives offered to physicians by managed care organizations. Between 1995 and 1996 
alone, four states passed laws restricting these financial incentives, and nine states passed 
laws requiring doctors to disclose their financial incentives to patients (Bennahum 1999). 
Even though capitation was a significant part of the managed care movement, 
recent studies suggest that it is on the decline. With the exception of primary care, the 
percentage of patients covered by capitation decreased in every major field in 1999 
(Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). Even in primary care, capitation's growth rate was 
very low compared to recent years past (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). This really 
should not come as a surprise, as capitation agreements were generally not profitable to 
anyone other than health plans. A majority of both physicians and hospitals surveyed 
reported profit losses due to capitation contracts (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). 
Both doctors and hospitals became increasingly unwilling to assume capitated risk 
because of the losses they were incurring. Both parties began organizing into larger 
groups so that they could have more negotiating clout against HMOs. In areas where 
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physicians quickly consolidated into large groups, capitation arrangements often declined 
almost immediately (Coile 2000). 
Another suggestion made by some trying to explain capitation's decline is the fact 
that medical groups had neither the money nor the expertise to manage risk like an 
insurance company (Bernstein 2000). Insurance companies have hundreds of millions of 
revenue coming in each month to pay claims, as well as staffs of skilled actuaries to 
calculate how much might be needed to handle claims and how deep the company's 
reserves ought to be (Bernstein 2000). Medical groups and hospitals have neither of 
those things. Although handling risk gives doctors some advantages, such as control over 
allocation of premiums, it stands that physicians are simply not as well geared toward 
handling risk as an insurance conlpany. 
Perhaps the most important issue regarding capitation is whether or not it harmed 
the doctor-patient relationship. This question is met with a very mixed response. 
Obviously, legislation requiring physicians to disclose their financial incentives to 
patients can cause a strain on the doctor-patient dynamic. If a patient believes that a 
physician may cut comers on care in order to supplement his income, then common sense 
would say that a degree of trust inherent in doctor-patient relationships of the past might 
be taken away. However, some studies indicate the opposite. One survey found that 
patients under capitation were skeptical about the financial motives of the managed care 
organization, but still trusted their physician to act in their best interest (Bennahum 
1999). As a matter of fact, the use of capitation as well as other managed care techniques 
often results in the physician acting as a "patient advocate," intervening with the plan on 
the patient's behalf. One survey found that over 60 % of physicians have acted on a 
-
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patient's behalf in order to get a needed prescription or procedure that was originally 
denied by the patient's health plan (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). Along the same 
lines, another study found that about one-third of doctors and nurses had exaggerated a 
patient's condition in order to get what they deemed to be necessary care (Toner 1999). 
However, there are also some signs that managed care has hindered the doctor-
patient relationship. When an HMO denies a requested procedure, it is hard for the 
patient to get angry with the HMO since there is usually no one from the plan around. 
Sometimes the patient ends up blaming the physician for the denial instead. As one 
Rhode Island doctor put it: "patients get mad at you when a procedure isn't covered even 
though it's not your fault. We end up being the bad guys." (Noonan 2000). 
It is very important that the doctor-patient relationship is not damaged, as no 
managed care organization can provide a substitute for a patient's trust in his or her 
physician (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Good communication between doctors and 
patients is imperative in order to improve the quality of health care. Only if this 
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Patients' Rights and Other Ethical Issues Arising From Managed Care 
The practice of medicine has always been fraught by many ethical dilemmas, 
everything from the issue of abortions to whether or not to treat severely impaired 
infants. However, the rise of managed care brought about many more ethical concerns. 
First and foremost on the list is the issue of patients' rights. 
Although they were not as opposed to managed care as were physicians, patients 
certain had several reasons to hold a negative view of HMOs and other managed care 
organizations. For one thing, patients are the least likely party to see the benefits of 
managed care. The lower costs seem only to benefit employers, who pay lower 
premiums, and health plans, who make more profits (Berenson and Zelman 1998). 
Moreover, patients often hold a negative view of many of the techniques that HMOs use 
in order to cut costs. Patients view a network as a loss of access to a favored physician. 
They also fear that plans choose doctors not based on competence but on who accepts the 
greatest discount (Berenson and Zelman 1998). To a certain extent, they are probably 
right. Patients also generally disapprove of utilization reviews, as they often lead to 
denial of a prescription or treatment that the patient believes is necessary. In fact, one 
survey said that as many as 90 % of patients experienced denials of treatment from their 
health plan in the last year (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). 
All of these issues led many to believe that patients were being treated unfairly by 
managed care organizations. And as previously mentioned in chapter 4, some research 
even pointed to the idea that managed care was decreasing the quality of care for patients. 
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One survey found that HMO members were more likely to face "barriers" to receiving 
care than patients in other types of health plans. For example, 23 % of HMO melnbers 
reported having to wait too long for approval of treatment, compared to 14 % of patients 
enrolled in less restrictive PPOs, and only 9 % of patients in traditional indemnity plans 
(Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). By the same token, research indicated that patients 
basically did not trust their HMOs. One study found that over two-thirds of patients 
believed that their plan would be more concerned with saving money rather than 
providing quality care (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). 
This "consumer backlash" against managed care directly resulted in more 
government regulation of HMOs. Most of the legislation was to protect patients' 
interests while receiving medical care. During the latter part of the Clinton 
administration, there was much discussion of passing a "patients' bill of rights" in 
Congress. Some of the key issues regarding patients' rights were: the ability of a patient 
to have an outside review of denied treatment; the ability to see any specialist in their 
plan and/or go outside the plan if the health plan lacks expertise if a needed area; that 
plans should reimburse any and all emergency care such that "emergency" would be 
defined by a prudent layperson (Baldor 1998, Bennahum 1999, and Coile 2000). 
Although these and other patients' rights concerns have been under much 
discussion on Capitol Hill, Congress has yet to pass a patients' bill of rights to date. 
However, many state legislatures have decided to take actions of their own in regulating 
managed care organizations. In 1997 alone, state legislatures passed a record 182 laws 
against managed care organizations (Brink and Shute 1997). Many of the laws passed by 
state legislatures addressed the sanle issues being discussed in Congress, as several states 
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passed their own versions of a patients' bill of rights. Furthermore, many of these state 
laws addressed other patients' rights issues. Some laws banned "drive-through 
deliveries," requiring a 48-hour stay for new mothers rather than the 24-hour stays that 
many HMOs were imposing (Baldor 1998). Other laws required HMOs to disclose not 
only their financial incentives to patients, but their preauthorization requirements, 
specialist panels, and typical waiting times as well (Bennahum 1999). Connecticut was 
the first state to allow outside review of a health plan's denial, while Texas, Georgia, and 
California all passed laws allowing patients to sue their HMOs (Brink and Shute 1997). 
In fact, the first HMO malpractice lawsuit filed by a consumer was in Texas in 1998 
(Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). 
Many consumers were very relieved by all of the legislation regulating managed 
care organizations, particularly by the ability to sue their HMOs. However, these 
lawsuits proved to be fairly ineffective. In nearly all lawsuits against managed care 
organizations in the last decade, HMOs have hidden behind the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 (Japsen 2000). ERISA was originally enacted to 
protect employee pension plans from state regulation, but actually protects all employee 
benefits, including health plans (Bennahum 1999). This basically translated into HMOs 
being immune from lawsuits in state courts. Nonetheless, a Chicago-based HMO 
recently lost a lawsuit brought by a patient who wanted the HMO to pay for the 
recommendations of an outside physician (Japsen 2000). This was a landmark victory for 
those wanting to take legal action against the HMO industry, as it seemed to show that 
HMOs could not use ERISA as immunity from all lawsuits. 
,.,. 
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Although all of the previously mentioned pieces of legislation have been passed by 
individual states, there has been one major federal law passed recently trying to protect 
patients'rights: the Health Insurance POl1ability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 
1996. HIPAA has a couple of major provisions that are aimed at protecting patients' 
rights. First, HIP AA limits, and in some cases bans, the use of "pre-existing condition" 
exclusions, which some HMOs had been using to avoid having to absorb the high costs of 
treating the extremely ill. Secondly, if a person should lose his or her job, HIP AA allows 
that person to continue their health coverage until they find a new job (Baldor 1998). 
Finally, HIP AA tries to help small businesses afford to offer health benefits by 
establishing medical savings accounts. Although there are a few loopholes in HIP AA 
that allow HMOs too much leeway, this legislation was still a step in the right direction. 
In addition to passing laws that protect patients' rights, many states have also 
enacted legislation that protects physicians from abusive HMO practices. Many states 
have placed a ban on "gag clauses" in physician contracts. Gag clauses reprimand 
physicians who badmouth the HMO, and they also penalize doctors who advocate care 
not covered by the plan (Baldor 1998 and Bennahum 1999). In another move protecting 
doctors from HMOs, twenty-six states have passed "prompt payment" regulations that 
require health plans to pay claims within a specified period (Coile 2000). Yet other states 
have passed "any willing provider" laws, which require managed care organizations to 
contract with any physician that is willing to provide care to its enrollees. 
Despite all of the attention that it has received, the issue of patients' rights is not 
the only ethical concern raised by managed care. One of today' s extremely hot topics is 
the rise of for-profit health care. Managed care health plans fall into either of two 
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categories: non-profit and for-profit. In non-profit HMOs, such as Kaiser Permanente, all 
profits are used to give more health care or improve existing care. For example, some 
non-profit HMOs use their extra earnings to enhance existing prevention programs or to 
establish prenatal care programs (Bennahum 1999). Such is not the case in for-profit 
HMOs, such as Aetna and Cigna. For-profit HMOs, also euphemized as "investor-
owned" HMOs, spend almost all of their profits on advertising, management expenses, 
and shareholder dividends (Bennahum 1999). Thus arises the main argument against for-
profit managed care: that these insurers will ultimately skimp on care in order to 
maintain their profit margins. 
Does the practice of for-profit medicine actually harm the quality of health care? 
Although there has not been a great deal of research on this subject until recently, most 
studies suggest that for-profit care actually does decrease the quality of care. One major 
study found that on every one of fourteen quality-of-care indicators, for-profit health 
plans scored worse than their non-profit counterparts (Stolberg 1999). For example, this 
research found that non-profit HMOs had 72.3 % of their two-year old enrollees fully 
immunized, as compared to 63.9 % of those in for-profit plans. Similarly, 70.6 % of non-
profit plan enrollees were given potentially life-saving beta-blockers after heart attacks, 
compared with only 59.2 % of those enrolled in for-profit HMOs (Stolberg 1999). All of 
these indicators should not be very surprising when one considers that in 1998 non-profit 
plans spent 91 % of their revenues on patients, while for-profit managed care 
organization spent only 79 % of their revenues on health care (Bennahum 1999). No one 
denies that sound business and management practices may well serve to eliminate waste 
-
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and inefficiencies from the practice of medicine. However, medicine is not just another 
business, as people's health and even their lives are at stake. 
Even though for-profit medicine appears to hinder health care quality, it has 
become the dominant form of managed care in the United States. By 1997, 82.8 % of all 
managed care organizations were for-profit, and 62 % of all HMO patients were enrolled 
in these organizations (Brink and Shute 1997 and Stolberg 1999). The primary reason 
that there been this growth is because for-profit HMOs have a great deal more capital 
than their non-profit counterparts. Non-profit managed care organizations do not have 
the opportunity to sell shares of their stock and thus raise capital the way that for-profit 
HMOs do (Bennahum 1999). 
Although for-profit managed care has become dominant, many experts are 
convinced that these investor-owned organizations will not succeed. First of all, 
economists are convinced that the American public simply will not support a health care 
model in which over 20 % of premiums are skimmed off the top for shareholder 
dividends and high administrative costs (Coile 2000). Others believe that for-profit 
managed care organizations may struggle to survive because of increased government 
regulation, and because of the possibility that significant annual profits may be difficult 
to maintain once existing waste and inefficiencies in the health care system have been 
eliminated (Bennahum 1999). Regardless of whether or not for-profit health care thrives, 
the idea that an HMO would skimp on care in order to maintain profits is a startling 
proposition. 
One other ethical issue that has come into light due to the rise of managed care is 
the practice of selective marketing, also known as "cherry-picking." Selective marketing 
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is the process by which managed care organizations recruit healthier, and thus less costly, 
patients (Bennahum 1999). This can be done by several methods. First, many HMOs use 
"pre-existing condition" exclusions, saying that they will not enroll a patient who already 
has a serious illness. Another such technique is for managed care organizations to 
contract only with employers, because people in the workforce are generally young and 
healthy compared to those who are disabled or retired. Yet another technique used to 
attract healthy customers has been seen by HMOs holding "signups" at social functions 
that generally exclude the frail or bedridden (Bennahum 1999). 
Obviously, managed care organizations try to attract healthy customers because 
they are less costly to treat. However, this is clearly an ethical violation. It is the sick 
people that tITlly need the most medical attention, yet they often have trouble getting 
coverage. Physicians have conceivably the biggest ethical dilemma in this case, because 
they are torn between trying to treat those who need health care the most and trying to do 
what is best for the organization who contracts them. 
Chapter 6 
Medicare and Medicaid 
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In the mid-1960s, both the Medicare and Medicaid programs were passed into law 
in order to help those who had trouble obtaining health insurance. Medicare was 
introduced in order to provide health care to the elderly, while Medicaid was passed in 
order to help the poor and permanently disabled obtain medical care. Medicare consists 
of two parts: part A, which covers inpatient care, and part B, which covers outpatient 
care and physician visits. Both parts have a deductible, and part B requires a 20 % co-
payment after the deductible is met (Baldor 1998). Medicare does not currently offer a 
prescription benefit. However, many companies offer supplemental insurance to 
Medicare patients, often known as "Medigap insurance." This supplemental insurance 
covers the deductibles and co-payments of Medicare, and usually includes prescription 
coverage. 
Medicaid, which provides health care to the poor and permanently disabled, is run 
a bit differently than Medicare. Unlike Medicare, each state determines how to run its 
Medicaid program, and the federal government then reimburses the state between 50 and 
83 % of the cost, depending on the state's per capita income (Baldor 1998). For instance, 
Oregon decided to create a priority list of diagnoses, and rations its Medicaid funds 
according to that list (Baldor 1998). Tennessee employed a program called TennCare in 
order to cover its Medicaid eligible population, with around 95 % of these people now 
insured (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). The TennCare program, discussed in more 
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detail shortly, provides a good case study of the pros and cons of enrolling Medicaid 
patients in managed care organizations. 
Although both of these programs were enacted with the best of intentions, they 
were far from perfect. To achieve political passage and initial acceptance, both programs 
were ratified without effective mechanisms for controlling costs. Specifically, the 
Medicare statute had a clause that prohibited the federal government from "exercising 
any supervision or control over the practice of medicine" (Berenson and Zelman 1998). 
Furthermore, the fee-for-service system really hurt Medicare and Medicaid, again 
because of the lack of guidelines. For decades, physicians were charging exorbitant 
amounts to the federal programs, knowing that they would be reimbursed. 
Because of these reasons, the two programs, and in particular Medicare, became 
extremely inflationary. For example, medical inflation averaged 3 % per year before 
Medicare was enacted. During the first five years after the law was passed, that figure 
averaged 7.9 % per year (Berenson and Zelnlan 1998). By the early 1980s, Medicare's 
costs were five to six times greater than original estimates, while doctors and hospitals 
were racking up profits (Berenson and Zelman 1998). The situation became so bad that 
in 1983 the Reagan administration mandated that hospitals under Medicare be reimbursed 
using diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) rather than a fee-for-service system (Deloitte & 
Touche and VHA 2000). DRGs, previously mentioned in chapter 1, were basically 
standardized reimbursements hospitals were to receive based on a national average cost 
for a particular diagnosis (Baldor 1998). This new reimbursement system completely 
altered hospitals' incentives when dealing with Medicare patients. Up until then, longer 
hospital stays and more procedures meant more revenue. However, the introduction of 
-
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DRGs meant that these same factors now led to higher costs and fewer profits (Berenson 
and Zelman 1998). The establishment of diagnosis-related groups was significant 
because it was the first major form of guidelines set on health care payments, and a 
preview of what was to come with the rise of managed care. 
In spite of the introduction of DRGs to help alleviate its high inflation, Medicare 
was hardly cost-efficient. In fact, there were so many wasted resources in Medicare that 
many HMOs, particularly for-profit HMOs, decided that Medicare would be their new 
"promised land" (Eckholm 1995). By applying managed care techniques such as curbing 
excess procedures and pursuing prevention, HMOs figured they could turn Medicare's 
wastefulness into significant profits. Thus, there was a large movement of managed care 
organizations trying to sign up Medicare patients, with the peak of the movement coming 
in the mid-1990s. In fact, Medicare HMO enrollment doubled between 1993 and 1997 
(Berenson and Zelman 1998). HMOs appealed to seniors by offering a deal that seemed 
to be too good to be true. Medicare enrollees could sign up, pay nothing, and get all of 
their previous Medicare benefits plus prescription coverage and no co-payments 
(Eckholm 1995). What's more, this meant that people could drop their Medigap 
insurance, which typically ran anywhere from $60 to $100 per month (Eckholm 1995). 
The only catch was that those who joined were required to have a gatekeeper and stay 
within their HMO's network of providers. 
Many seniors obviously decided that using these HMO techniques would be worth 
all the extra benefits, as Medicare HMO enrollment reached its peak growth rate in 1996 
at around 36 % (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). Meanwhile, Congress was busy 
looking at the possibility of the Medicare program crashing in the near future. 
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Depending on the source, Medicare's hospital trust fund is expected to go into the red 
anywhere from 2015 to 2020 (Appleby 2000 and Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). 
What's more, some research actually suggested that the government was actually losing 
money when Medicare patients joined HMOs (Eckholm 1995). This was because the 
seniors who were joining HMOs were found to be generally healthier than those who 
were shying away from HMOs. However, the government continued to pay the same 
amount per Medicare patient (Eckholm 1995). As a result, Congress passed the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997. This legislation drastically changed the roles of HMOs in the 
Medicare market. 
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) basically put higher standards on HMOs who 
wished to be in the Medicare market. The BBA forbade Medicare HMOs from using pre-
existing condition clauses, required these HMOs to reimburse any and all emergency 
services as defined by a prudent layperson, and required each Medicare HMO to have an 
internal quality assurance program. The legislation also had clauses requiring prompt 
payments to physicians, increased capitated payments to physicians, as well as many 
other articles that made it tougher for Medicare HMOs to tum profits. In fact, some have 
estimated that the BBA would reduce payments to Medicare HMOs nationwide by over 
$22 billion dollars through 2003 (Coile 2000). As a result, many HMOs have simply 
begun to leave the Medicare market. In the first year after the Balanced Budget Act was 
passed, 43 HMOs dropped their Medicare operations (Coile 2000). Since most of the 
HMOs who originally entered the market were for-profit organizations, they decided it 
was not worth the effort if the Medicare market could no longer be milked for all those 
excess earnings. During the mid-1990s, the total number of Medicare patients enrolled in 
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HMOs nationwide had reached as high as 16 %, but in 2000 Medicare HMO enrollment 
was the lowest in five years (Deloitte& Touche and VHA 2000 and Coile 2000). 
Unlike Medicare, Medicaid recipients have continued to be enrolled in managed 
care at an increasing rate. Of the roughly 36 million people eligible for Medicaid, about 
one-third of them were enrolled in a managed care organization in 1998 (Deloitte & 
Touche and VHA 2000). By 1999, this figure had risen to aln10st 40 % of Medicaid 
patients (Coile 2000). The main reason that Medicaid HMOs continue to grow is because 
Medicaid is run differently by each state, as opposed to Medicare, which is universally 
run by the federal government. Since Medicaid is run by each state, there are really no 
barriers such as the BBA. In fact, Medicaid programs in some states have enrolled 
greater than two-thirds of their Medicaid patients in managed care (Deloitte & Touche 
and VHA 2000). Tennessee, with its TennCare program, has enrolled over 90 % of its 
Medicaid patients into managed care (Coile 2000). This program provides a good 
example of both the rewards and the difficulties associated with shifting to a managed 
Medicaid program. 
In 1994, Tennessee converted all of its Medicaid benefits to managed care with the 
goal of using the savings to cover those who were uninsured as well as those who were 
not eligible for traditional insurance. This program was known as TennCare. People 
who are eligible for Medicaid automatically qualify. Those who were previously 
uninsured may join TennCare by paying income-adjusted premiums, as well as 
deductibles. Those who are not eligible for other insurance, known as "uninsurables," 
qualify for TennCare merely by presenting a letter from a health plan denying them 
coverage. The program boomed. By 1998, 24 % of the state's total population had 
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health insurance through TennCare, with over 90 % of Medicaid patients being covered 
(Kilborn 1999). The program grew so much that Tennessee decided to close TennCare to 
the uninsured once enrollment reached 1.3 million (Kilborn 1999). 
However, Tennessee kept enrolling "uninsurables," in addition to Medicaid-
eligible patients. The state signed up so many people into the program, that by 1999 they 
realized that they were running dangerously short on funds (Coile 2000). Since 
Tennessee was facing a budget deficit, TennCare had to cut its costs. The state is now 
cutting benefits, raising premiums, and tightening eligibility (Kilborn 1999). One 
problem that led to TennCare's high costs was capping enrollment. The state kept 
enrolling uninsurables, the most costly type of patient, but quit enrolling the previously 
uninsured, who were required to pay premiums. Thus, TennCare costs were rising, as 
their patient contributions remained stagnant. Another trouble for the program was the 
probability that many health plans were "dumping" their most sickly patients on 
TennCare, simply by denying coverage more frequently. According to the program's 
director, Brain Lapps, the main problem with TennCare is that all of its patients want 
"everything for nothing" (Kilborn 1999). According to him, many recipients could help 
pay for their premiums and help reduce TennCare's costs if they would "curb their use of 
cell phones and cigarettes" (Kilborn 1999). 
However, TennCare did show a lot of promise. It was a huge first step in the 
direction of universal care, as many other states can now learn from Tennessee's 
mistakes. Actually, the TennCare program is remarkably similar in theory to Clinton's 
health care reform plan proposed in 1993 that brought so much criticism from Capitol 
... 
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Hill. Regardless, there seenlS to be no reason why more states will not continue to move 
their Medicaid programs into managed care in the near future . 
Chapter 7 
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The Future of Managed Health Care in America 
In order to see what direction managed care will take in the near future, it is useful 
to consider some of the trends seen in the industry today. Whereas the primary goal of 
HMOs during the beginning of the managed care takeover was to have high enrollment 
rates, many HMOs are now focusing on their profitability. The industry is undergoing 
what is known as the "insurance cycle" (Coile 2000). When premiums were low, 
enrollment soared while profits suffered. In fact, in 1997, during some of the fastest 
enrollment growth the industry had seen, HMO losses nationwide totaled $768 million 
(Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). Kaiser alone lost over $500 million in 1998 and 
1999, while the highly popular Oxford health plan nearly went under despite doubling its 
membership (Coile 2000). Due to these startling losses, many HMOs had to raise 
premiums and exit the low-profit markets (i.e. Medicare) in order to restore their bottom 
lines. The HMO industry is still working on improving its profitability even today, as 
premiums rose almost 10% between 1999 and 2000, and some experts predict that 
premiums will increase by nearly 20 % in 2001 (Appleby 2000 and Coile 2000). 
However, it seems that HMOs' strategy of focusing on profitability has backfired. 
First of all, HMO premium hikes have closed the price gap between HMOs and PPOs, 
which has given many people all the more reason to spend just a few extra dollars to get 
the freedom of choice associated with PPOs. Secondly, the premium hikes have drawn 
negative reactions from both physicians and employers. As a result, some employers are 
now starting to contract directly with physician groups, rather than going through a 
.. 'W' 
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managed care organization (Coile 2000). However, HMOs should perhaps be more 
concerned with upsetting physicians rather than employers. Many physician groups are 
now becoming too large to be pushed around by managed care organizations, and when a 
contract dispute occurs between physicians and plans, the media tends to favor 
physicians. 
In some areas, HMOs are doing so poorly that some have said that HMOs are 
showing signs of a dying industry (Coile 2000). There are very few new HMOs entering 
the market, existing HMOs are consolidating into a few large firnls, and new customer 
enrollment is down, with HMO enrollment hovering around 80 million for the past 
couple of years (Coile 2000). Furthermore, differentiation among many HMOs is 
lacking, and innovative companies such as Oxford are failing (Deloitte & Touche and 
VHA 2000). 
However, HMOs are still surviving because they keep finding new ways to rid the 
health care system of inefficiencies. Many HMOs are now utilizing more physician 
assistants and nurse practitioners to take over the duties of highly paid doctors (Deloitte 
& Touche and VHA 2000). Moreover, many patients are now seeking alternative 
therapies, such as chiropractic and acupuncture, instead of traditional medicine. Both of 
these factors are further increasing the oversupply of physicians, which is forcing many 
physicians to continue to accept deep discounts from health plans (Deloitte & Touche and 
VHA 2000). Most importantly, if the economy slows down a great deal, which is 
becoming a possibility, HMOs may make a comeback due to their rigorous cost controls. 
It should be clear by now that managed care as it now stands is a flawed system 
that probably needs to be altered in order to thrive. However, there is much debate over 
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how health care financing should ideally be structured. Some experts argue that a 
government-run system is the best answer. After all, government-run health care works 
all over the world, as the United States and South Africa are the only two industrialized 
countries without a national health care system (Baldor 1998). Furthermore, many argue 
that a national health care system could still allow our private sector to thrive. For 
example, in Canada the government is the only payer in the health care system, but all of 
the providers in the nation are in the private sector (Baldor 1998). Yet another stance in 
favor of government intervention claims that HMOs made their one-time impact on 
premiums, which will now rise sharply again without action from the government (Coile 
2000). 
However, it is difficult for many others, myself included, to believe that a 
government-run health care system is the best solution. Due to the country's general 
distrust of politicians, many people fear that a government-run system would be 
bureaucratic and expensive (Bennahum 1999). Moreover, market-driven solutions are 
usually more effective than government-enforced ones. As Robert Berenson and Walter 
Zelman said in their book The Managed Care Blues and How to Cure Them: "History 
shows that companies are less likely to get serious about quality when it is enforced by 
government than when survival in the marketplace demands it" (1998). Rather than 
regulating bad HMOs, we should support good HMOs, and they would drive out the bad 
ones. Nonetheless, if the number of uninsured An1ericans increases to an unacceptable 
level, perhaps near 25 %, then Washington may decide to act. 
Is managed care then the best scenario for America's health care system? 
Probably. Managed care benefits those who pay the largest part of the nation's medical 
.. 
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bill: the government and employers (Bennahum 1999). However, for managed care to 
exist in the long-term, the quality of the system needs to be improved while still 
maintaining its cost-effectiveness. In order to accomplish this, there are several major 
strategies that I believe plans, providers, and purchasers must focus on. Although there 
may not be any obvious short-term incentives for a couple of these strategies, all 
stakeholders involved need to realize that the goal is managed care's success in the long 
run. 
First of all, I believe that quality health care must be rooted in non-profit health 
plans. It is simply contradictory to believe that both the patient's and the shareholder's 
interests can be met. As discussed in chapter 5, in order to maximize shareholder value, 
for-profit HMOs will ultimately have to skimp on care. Furthermore, for-profit 
organizations give physicians a very negative outlook on managed care, as many view 
these organizations as hypocritical. For-profit HMOs want doctors to act in the best 
interests of patients even while these HMOs are shifting money away from patients to 
investors (Berenson and Zelman 1998). What's more, non-profit HMOs are a better 
option for improving health care quality, because these organizations exist to serve the 
community, not Wall Street. The state of Minnesota has been a pioneer in deciding that 
non-profit care is integral to quality health care. Under state law, every health plan that 
operates in Minnesota must be of non-profit status (Bennahum 1999). 
Secondly, managed care needs to continue to focus on preventative medicine. This 
is a technique that can serve to both improve quality and control costs. Not only does 
catching conditions early help people avoid painful illnesses and hospitalizations, but it 
helps to avoid the high costs associated with treating such diseases. Many HMOs are 
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realizing this, and are offering nl0re prevention programs such as childhood 
immunizations and annual mammograms (Coile 2000). Although preventative treatments 
can often be costly, they are almost always less expensive than treating the disease that 
they are trying to discover. 
The third important step to improving the quality of the health care system would 
be to have employees choose health plans rather than employers. As it stands, managed 
care organizations have more reason to lavish attention on human resources managers 
than on patients (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Human resources managers are the ones 
reaching agreements with health plans, and cost is generally the top factor when deciding 
what plan to purchase. In fact, less than half of employers even receive any data on 
health plan quality (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). If employees decided what 
plans to purchase, patients would then have the same leverage to enforce quality 
possessed by consumers in most markets: the ability to leave (Berenson and Zelman 
1998). Although this is a large step, it is a very important one because plans would begin 
to compete on quality rather than on price. 
The fourth strategy in working towards increased quality of care is for health plans 
and purchasers to work on reaching long-term agreements. Currently, consumers are 
changing health plans so often that there is little reason for managed care organizations to 
focus on long-term care (Coile 2000). Many patients leave their plan before many 
preventative measures are taken. If HMOs had long-term contracts with patients, this 
would allow HMOs to utilize more prevention and early detection. Not only could this 
improve the quality of life for some people, but it is much less costly than expensive 
hospitalizations. Moreover, a patient who is using the same health plan will probably use 
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the same physician. This is beneficial because then the physician can really get to know 
a patient's history and conditions, and could perhaps be able to better diagnose any of the 
patient's illnesses. As discussed in chapter 4, a sound doctor-patient relationship is 
crucial to high quality health care. 
The fifth strategy for improving managed care is for providers and managed care 
organizations to inlprove their relationship. In many areas of the country, plans and 
doctors are "at war," as they are involved in heated contract talks that sometimes lead to 
front-page stories in the local paper. Many feel that this type of conflict could eventually 
result in government intervention. Providers and insurers need to start viewing one 
another as partners, rather than vendors with whom they nlust contract (Berenson and 
Zelman 1998). This would be an important first step toward community-based health 
care, because there are so many benefits that could come from the cooperation of plans 
and providers. First of all, physicians are more capable than anyone in controlling costs, 
because they are the closest to patients and can best determine what a patient actually 
needs. Moreover, if physicians were deeply involved in managed care organizations, 
they could publish their own material of health plan quality. Just as they can be integral 
in controlling costs, doctors may also be the best people for judging a health plan's 
quality. What's more, if doctors were publishing reports on quality, they would have 
more merit when they blew the whistle on a plan that was undermining the quality of care 
(Berenson and Zelman 1998). Physician-plan cooperation would also lead to more 
coordinated care, which could reduce the number of costly oversights and duplications of 
effort. 
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Fortunately, a couple of managed care organizations have taken steps to try and 
improve their relationships with physicians. UnitedHealth, a Minneapolis-based HMO, 
has decided to completely abandon its pre-authorization process and will give doctors the 
final say on treatments. The HMO's rationale was that since 99% of physician requests 
were approved anyway, the pre-authorization procedure was worth neither the 
administrative costs it piled up nor the damage it was doing to provider relations (Coile 
2000). Aetna is considering significant changes in the way it provides managed care to 
help settle a huge fraud and racketeering suit brought against it (Geyelin 2001). Aetna's 
main goal is to improve its relationship with doctors. Aetna, traditionally known as a 
hardball negotiator with physician groups, often received very poor ratings in the area of 
physician and patient satisfaction (Ball 2000). However, their hardball strategy backfired 
as other managed care organizations tried to improve these relationships, and benefited 
from doing so. Some of the changes Aetna is considering are ending the use of financial 
incentives such as bonuses and withholds, limiting the use of capitation, and stopping use 
of medical guidebooks created by actuarial firms who have little or no medical training 
(Geyelin 2001). Other HMOs are also trying to improve provider relationships. Since 
many HMOs have had losses in recent years, they are becoming more willing to share 
risk with providers (Coile 2000). Since physicians keep forming larger groups in order to 
have more negotiating clout, this is probably a good idea. 
The sixth and final step in order to ensure the existence of managed care in the 
long-term is universal coverage. This will also prove to be the most difficult step to 
accomplish. Most sources put the number of Americans currently uninsured at around 40 
million (Coile 2000, Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000, and others). An obvious key to 
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a successful health care system is for everyone to have access to health care. However, 
there is much debate over how this problem should be addressed. A government-run 
system could definitely provide universal health coverage, but the disadvantages to this 
system have already been discussed. Some believe that all businesses should be required 
to provide insurance, with the government insuring those who are unemployed. The 
main problem with this idea is that many small businesses cannot afford to offer health 
insurance, and may go under as result (Appleby 2000). A couple of possible solutions to 
this dilemma are government subsidies for small businesses, or a universal pool for small 
businesses to purchase insurance as a group. Tennessee's TennCare program, discussed 
previously in chapter 6, made a serious attempt at universal coverage on the state level. 
Any proposed program with the goal of universal coverage should study TennCare's 
successes and difficulties. Regardless, the issue of how to provide insurance for all 
Americans needs to be addressed if managed care is to be the health care system of the 
future. 
Adhering to the six previously mentioned recomn1endations should help managed 
care organizations improve the quality of care they offer without sacrificing their cost-
efficiency. However, an HMO's reputation for high quality may be a marketplace loser 
because it attracts the highest cost cases (Berenson and Zelman 1998). Ideally, all HMOs 
would try to be known for quality, and this wouldn't even be and issue. However, if only 
a few HMOs became known for high quality, they might be penalized by attracting those 
who are seriously ill. As a remedy for this situation, a patient's health status could be 
figured into the price of insurance premiums. On the other hand, this is a very 
controversial topic, as many believe that the very ill should not be further persecuted by 
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having to pay higher premiums. If premiums are not going to be risk-adjusted, then there 
at least needs to be legislation limiting the ability of plans to attract only healthy patients 
(known as "selective marketing," discussed in chapter 5). In addition to improving 
quality, the health care system needs to support managed care organizations that are 
committed to inclusiveness (Bennahum 1999). 
-
Conclusion 
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The Census Bureau estimates that the number of people over the age of 65 will 
double by the year 2050 (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000). Since these people require 
the most medical attention, health care costs will rise sharply as well. Obviously, a 
method to control health care costs was not only needed for the spiraling premiums of the 
late 1980s, but will be integral in the health care system of the future. Even if the 
economy is in such great shape that covering these incredible medical costs is possible, a 
cost-control method would still be needed. We don't want to spend all of our money on 
health care; we also value education, recreation, and other things of that nature. The fee-
for-service systenl as it existed would not have allowed us to face these incredible costs. 
Thus, managed care was given a chance. 
Managed care set its sights on being the opposite of the fee-for-service system: 
organization instead of fragmentation, cost-consciousness for cost-unconsciousness, and 
accountability rather than autonomy (Berenson and Zelman 1998). The ideal managed 
care system would eliminate all inefficiencies from medicine, and provide high-quality, 
low-cost care. Managed care succeeded on at least one of these aspects: low costs. The 
United States spent $350 billion less in 2000 on health care than was estimated by 
Congress in 1993 (Appleby 2000). 
But while managed care undoubtedly decreased health care spending, it has a much 
spottier record when it comes to quality. Many physicians feel that managed care 
interferes with quality medical care by using techniques such as pre-authorizations. 
Whereas managed care organizations claimed that the quality of care would be improved, 
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many studies suggest that HMO quality indicators are roughly the same or slightly less 
than those of the fee-for-service industry (Deloitte & Touche and VHA 2000 and 
Easterbrook 1997). Moreover, there are often visible cases of a patient's rights being 
abused by the managed care system. However, managed care's major flaw has not been 
the harm it may have caused these few, but not improving quality for the many. 
In order for managed care to solidify its status as the health care system of the 
future, its main focus needs to be quality improvement. There are six important strategies 
that need to be focused upon that could improve quality without sacrificing cost-
efficiency: the shift from for-profit to non-profit care, preventative medicine, consumers 
choosing health plans rather than employers, long-term contract agreements between 
plans and purchasers, a more cooperative relationship between providers and plans, and 
the attainment of universal coverage. If everyone involved in health care delivery could 
focus on these tactics, managed care would no longer be the focus of physician, patient, 
and nledia criticism, but would be regarded as the idea that saved the nation's health care 
system from disaster. 
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